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STATE:\fEXT OF r:CHE KIXD OF CASE 
So far as the appeal is concerned, this is an action to 
recover b:- way of counterclaim the reasonable value of 
building materials sold and delivered to the plaintiff by 
the defendant and to foreclose a materialman's lien. 
DISPOSFrJOJ\ E\ LOWER COURT 
The ea~e was tried without a jur:- and judgment was 
entered awarcbng the defendant the amount prayed for 
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2 
in its cross-complaint. Its claim of lien was adjudged to 
have been waived and released. The plaintiff's com-
plaint which sought to recover dan1ages for slander of 
title, consisting of recording of the materialman's lien, 
was disn1issed. Upon motion of the plaintiff to amend 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, the plaintiff 
was awarded an attorney's fee in the .mnount of $1,000.00 
which was deducted from the amount awarded the defend-
ant in the original Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks (a) reversal of those portions of 
the J udg1nent and .. Amend eel Judgment which cancel the 
m.aterialn1an's lien and award the plaintiff an attorney's 
fee, (b) a judgment in its favor foreclosing its lien, (c) 
attorney's fee in the sum of $1,000.00, and (d) costs of 
preparing lien and abstracting. 
ST·ATEMEXT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Brimwood Homes, Inc., owns a tract 
of land in Salt Lake County which it subdivided into lots 
known as Jordan Yillage Xo. :2 SubdiYision (R. 1). It 
obtained from Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, hereinafter designated Prudential, a com-
mitment to finance the construction of hmnes on the lots 
(R. 152). A nwrtgage on each lot was executed to secure 
each loan. Abstracts of these mortgages are contained 
in Exhibit D-6. Defendant l(nudsen Builders Supply 
Con1pany sold and delivered to the plaintiff Brimwood 
Homes a large amount of building n1ateri.al which plain-
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tiff used in the construction of the homes. As building 
progressed, plaintiff delivered to the defendant written 
authorizations to Prudential to pay defendant a specified 
amount on account of materials furnished to the plaintiff 
by the defendant (Ex. P-7-12). The payment was to be 
charged to the plaintiff with respect to its loan des-
ignated by number. On the other side of this written 
authorization was a receipt and lien release to be exe-
cuted by the defendant. Armed with this authorization, 
defendant presented it to Prudential, executed the re-
ceipt and lien release and received the sum specified in 
the .authorization (R. 120). 
Inasmuch .as the case turns upon the legal effect to 
be given to the receipt release, we set forth below for the 
convenience of the ronrt an exact copy of one of them. 
RECEIPT AND LIEN RELEASE 
Salt Lake City, Utah, April 21, 1961 
Received from PRFDEXTIAL FEDERAL SAYINGS 
AXD LOAN ASSOCIATION, (hereinafter designated 
Association), the sum of Six Hundred Ten and 60/100 
Dollars ($610.60) in Full payment of labor and/or rna-
Partial 
terials furnished and delivered by the undersigned for 
construction of building and improvements on Lot 203 of 
Jordan Village No. 2. This receipt is executed and 
delivered by the undersigned to the Association to induce 
it to make payment to the undersigned of the above stated 
sum from funds held by it for the owner of above de-
scribed real property and in consideration thereof the 
undersigned hereby waives, releases and discharges any 
lien or right to lien the undersigned has or may hereafter 
acquire against said real property. 
KNUDSEN BUILDERS SUPPLY CO. 
/s/ Leland A. Searle, Treas. 
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Sixteen of such receipts \\'Pre executed by defendant 
and delivered to Prudential (Ex. P-7-12). The only 
variation in them is with rr~p<>et to the date, the amount 
of money and the lot number. 
The trial court found that between the 19th day of 
February, 1961 .and the 27th tlay of ::\fay, 1961, the de-
fendant sold and delivered to the plaintiff, at its special 
instance and request, building rnaterials of the reason-
able value of $3,911.64 after crediting all payments there-
tofore made; that the n1aterials were used by the plaintiff 
in the construction of improvements on the lots; that the 
last rnaterial was furnished on :Jiay 26, 1961; that de-
fendant's notice of claim of lien was recorded on July 
18, 1961 ; that at the time each payment "~as made by 
Prudential to the defendant, there remained a balance 
due from the plaintiff; and that the account was never 
paid in full. It also found that n1aterials were supplied 
by the defendant to the respective lots both after and 
before the execution of the applieable receipt (R. 36-41). 
The plaintiff, .according to the findings also made pay-
n1ents direct to the defendant but at no tin1e was plain-
tiff's account paid in full. The couri concluded that by 
executing the receipt releases and delivering them to 
Prudential, the defendant rele.ased and discharged any 
lien which it then had or which it thereafter acquired 
(R. 39-40). 
ARG l ':Jl EXT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT EHR1~:D IX COXCLUD-
ING TI-IAT Dl~FEXDA:\T \VAJ"VED AND 
RELEASED IT'S LJ:EN. 
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1 T nder the fads found by the court below there can 
lw no question hut tk1t the defendant, Knudsen Builder~ 
Rnppl~, Con1pany, waH entitled to and perfected a valid 
materialman'~ lien upon Lots 203, 204, 206, 207, 212 and 
21:1, Jordan Yillage X o. 2 Subdivision, as security for 
thP balance due of $3,911.64. (Sections 38-1-3, 38-1-7, 
U.C.A., 1953) Since Brinnvood !Tomes, Inc. was the 
owner of all of these lots at the time the building material 
was supplied, and purchased the materials directly, 
Knudsen Builders Supply Company was not required to 
prove the amount of material that went to each lot. See 
Ctnh SaV:ings and Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 
2d 335, 366 P.2d 598, and cases therein cited. However, 
the notice of claim of lien did make this allocation and 
the evidence supported it. 
The court's conclusion that defendant waived and 
released its lien b~~ executing and delivering to Pru-
dential the receipt release forms above set forth is con-
trary to well estab]jshed principles of law. It gives to 
those instruments a legal force and effect which they do 
not purport to havP and ·which the parties to them never 
intended they should have. 
It is to be noted that the plaintiff-respondent is not 
a party to the receipt releases. It follows that it cannot 
assert any rights under them unless it can successfully 
maintain that they were entered into for its benefit. This 
point was clearly stated h~, the Idaho Supreme Court in 
a recent decision involving the construction of a similar 
receipt release. 
''Inasmuch as the Eldredges were not parties 
to the agreement, the only way its terms could 
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be extended to them would be to consider them 
as third party beneficiaries." Dawson v. ~Eld­
redge, 372 P.2d 414 at 417. 
The question to be decided on this appeal, therefore, 
is whether the plaintiff is a third party beneficiary of 
the receipt releases. 
The receipt release has three distinct aspects. It is 
a receipt of a certain sum in full/partial payment of all 
labor and material furnished and delivered. Next, it is a 
release of any lien or right of lien the defendant then 
had. Third, it waives, releases and discharges any lien 
or right to lien which defendant might thereafter acquire 
against the property. The second phase of the instru-
ment is mere surplusage in any instance where the first 
aspect is a receipt of full pay1nent for all material pre-
viously deliYerd, since such payrnent prevented any lien 
from arising on account of such n1aterial. As shown 
above, the receipt provisions are ambiguous with respect 
to the nature of the payment. They are in the alterna-
tive -that is "full" or" partial"-- payment for material 
delivered to the lot identified therein. X either the word 
"full" nor ''partial" is stricken out on any receipt. It is 
impossible, therefore, to detern1ine fron1 the instrument 
whether the payment is partial or in full. This ambiguity 
is resolved by the uncontroverted evidence which estab-
lishes that the receipt release evidenced only partial pay-
ment for rnaterial delivered to each of the lots in 
question. Prudential's loan officer testified without ob-
jection that Prudential under the authorization for pay-
ment appearing on each receipt release was paying only 
for materials in the runount shown thereon; that Pru-
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dential made such payment pursuant to its duty to do so 
under its loan agreement with plaintiff and that Pruden-
tial was not paying for anything other than for materials 
in the amount indicated thereon. 
With respect to material sold to the plaintiff and 
delivered to the lots and for which payment was not 
made under one of the receipt releases executed by the 
defendant, it has no lien or right to lien until payment 
was demanded .and denied and until it complied with the 
statute providing for 1naterialmen's liens (Section 38-1-7, 
U.C.A .. 1953). Accordingly, defendant's claims of lien 
for those materials and for materials sold and delivered 
after the date of execution of each respective receipt 
release would be claims to liens which it might acquire 
at some future date. 
As the defendant makes no claim of lien against any 
lot for material furnished to the lot for which defendant 
acknowledged payment by· the applicable release, we are 
concerned in these proceedings with only the third fea-
ture of the release. Since this purports to release a lien 
not in existence and which may never come into existence, 
the third aspect of the rele.ase must be construed as a 
promise of the defendant to release a future possible lien. 
(A) PLAI~TlFF IS NOT A THIRD PARTY 
BENEFICIARY lT N DE R THE RE-
CEIPT RELEASES AND CAN ASSERT 
NO RIGHTS lTNDER THEM. 
The natural presnn1ption is that parties enter into a 
contract for the benefit of themselves. To overcome this 
presumption and successfully maintain that the contr.act 
was entered into for the benefit of a stranger, it must 
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contain language expressing such intent and purpose. 
This intention must be expressed in clear, direct and 
unambiguous language. 
"To recover as a third party beneficiary, one 
Inust show that the contract in question was made 
expressly for his benefit. ( Civ. Code § 1559; 
Shutes v. Cheney (1954) 123 CaL App. 2d 256, 
262, 266 P.2d 902.) \Vhile it is not necessary that 
the third party be specifically nmned a~ a bene-
ficiary . . . 'expressly' n1eans 'in an express 
manner; in direct or uninistakable terms; explici-
ty; definitely; directly' (le Ballister v. Redwood 
Theatres, Inc. (1934) 1 Cal. App. :2d 447, 448, 3G 
P.2d 827; Watson v. Aced (1957) 156 ·Cal. App. 
2d 87, 92, 319 P.2d 83) ... as stated in Shutes v. 
Cheney, supra, 'an intent to make the obligation 
inure to the benefit of the third party must have 
been clearly manifested by the contracting 
parties.' " City, etc. San Francisco v. Western 
Airlines, 22 Cal. Rptr. 216, at 225. 
As pointed out in .Jlackubin l:. Ctlri'iss-Wright Cor-
poration, 57 A.2d 318: 
". . . Even in those States which are most 
liberal in extending to third-party beneficiaries 
the right to sue on contracts made by others, the 
Courts recognize the right as an exception to the 
original rule of the cmnn1on law which arose from 
the natural presumption that a contract is in-
tended only for the benefit of those who enter 
into it. Thus it is generally accepted that before 
a stranger to a contract can avail himself of the 
exceptional privilege of suing for a breach there-
of, he must at least show that it was intended for 
his direct benefit. German Alliance Insurance Co. 
v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 33 S.Ct. 
32, 35, 57 L.Ed. 195, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 1000; Robins 
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Dr~· Dock & Hepair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 4R 
S.Ct. 13-~, 7:!. L.Ed. 290. An incidental beneficiary 
acquires by virtue of the promise no right against 
the promisor or the promisee. 1 Restatement, 
Contracts, ~ec. 147. In order to recover it is 
essenti.al that the beneficiary shall be the· real 
promisee~ i. e., that the promise shall be made 
to hiln in fact. though not in form. It is not 
enough that the contract may operate to his 
benefit. It must clearly appear that the parties 
intend to recognize him as the primary party in 
interest and as privy to the promise. Haines v. 
Pacific Bancorporation, 146 Or. 407, 30 P.2d 763; 
In re Guhelman, 2 Cir., 13 F.2d 730, 48 A.L.R. 
1037." 
If the direct and unambiguous language of the con-
tract discloses an intention to m.ake a gift of the promise 
to the third part~·, or if it discloses an intention that the 
performance of the pr0111ise shall satisfy an actual or 
supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the third 
party, the latter may enforce the contract. In the first 
premise, the third party is designated as a donee bene-
ficiary and in the second as a creditor beneficiary. If 
such language discloses an intention merely to benefit the 
third party as an incident to the performance of the pro-
mise, the third party as an incidental beneficiary cannot 
maintain an action on the contract and has no rights 
therein. See Oerman .. Alliance Insurance Company v. 
Home Water Si•pp!y Company, 222 lT.S. 220, 33 Sup. Ct. 
32, 57 L.Ed. 195, 42 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1000, Restatement 
Contracts, Section 133. 
The foregoing propositions are expressly approved 
and adopted by this court in Kelly v. Richards, 95 lTtah 
563, 83 P.2d 731. 
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The contract under consideration obviously contains 
no language indicating any intention on the part of the 
defendant or Prudential to confer any rights or benefits 
upon the plaintiff either b~· way of gift of a promise or 
in satisfaction of an actual or supposed or asserted duty 
of Prudential to the plaintiff. On the contrary, the plain 
intention of the parties to the contract and the primary 
purpose of entering into it w.as to benefit themselves. 
The plaintiff desired to obtain pay1nent for its materials, 
Prudential desired to maintain the priority and integrity 
of its mortgage and the sole purpose of the contract was 
to effectuate these objects. 
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the 
contr.act also make clear this purpose. The plaintiff had 
negotiated loans frmn Prudential to finance the construC-
tion of homes on the lots. Prudential had committed 
itself to n1ake the loans and had taken mortgages on the 
lots. These mortgages were practically v.alueless at the 
time they were executed because the lots were unim-
proved. To inject a substantial value into them as secur-
ity, it was essential that hon1es be constructed on the 
lots. To establish and 1naintain the priority of the mort-
gages, it was necessary that the loan funds be applied 
to the payment of the 1naterial that went into the homes. 
In this situation, the parties properly undertook to 
protect their respective interests by entering into these 
receipt release agreements. 
The facts in J( el!y L Riclw rd.-.·, supra, are closely 
analogous to those in the present case. Richards Barlow 
::\fotor Company whose name wa~ later changed to Tri-
State Motors applied to 'Villis Overland, Inc. for a fran-
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rhise to ~<'ll automobiles. Overland advised Tri-State 
that the franehise could not he granted unless Tri-State 
ohtained additional c-apital in the amount of fifty thou-
sand dollar~. Certain stockholders of Tri-State agreed to 
contribute thirty-five thousand dollars as additional 
capital in order to meet the requirement of Overland. 
The franchise was granted in reliance upon this .agree-
ment. Tri-State became insolvent; a receiver was ap-
pointed, and suit was brought against the stockholders 
to recover the thirty-five thousand dollars which they 
had agreed to contribute to Tri-State. Overland was not 
one of the creditors represented by the receiver. The 
court held that the complaint which set forth the above 
facts did not state a cause of action because neither the 
terms of the contract nor the facts and circumstances 
surrounding its execution disclosed any intention or pur-
pose to benefit the creditors represented by the receiver. 
rrhis decision, we submit, controls the present contro-
Dawson v. Eldredge .above cited is also squarely in 
point. Dawson agreed to furnish the labor and material 
to construct a dwelling house on the property of Eld-
redge. The latter negotiated a loan from Home Federal 
Savings and Loan Association to finance the construc-
tion. The loan association refused to complete the loan 
unless Dawson guaranteed to complete the construction 
and keep the property free from any liens for material 
or labor irrespective of who furnished it. Dawson com-
pleted the building .and brought suit to foreclose his lien 
for labor and material which Edredge had failed to pay 
for. The latter successfully contended in the lower court 
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12 
that Dawson had by virtue of his agreement with the 
loan association, waived his lien against the property. 
By unanhnous decision the Supreme Court of Idaho re-
versed the trial court and directed it to foreclose the 
lien. 
''Inasmuch as the Eldredges were not partie~ 
to the agreement, the only way its terms could be 
extended to them would be to consider them as 
'third party beneficiaries.' From the terms of 
the .agreement, and the circumstances surround-
ing its execution, it is self-evident that it was 
executed for the benefit of the association to 
assure to them that Dawson would complete the 
dwelling and protect the association and its mort-
gage lien from claims of materialmen and me-
chanics, and not for the benefit of the Eldredges 
. . . . \¥hile the loan made by the association was 
for the benefit of the Eldredges, they receiving 
the proceeds thereof, the prmnise by Dawson to 
the association to cmnplete the dwelling free of 
all liens was solely for the benefit of the associa-
tion, to assure the improvements on the property 
would be made, thereby providing security for 
the loan. The court erred in its determination 
that Dawson waived his rights to claim of lien, 
as against the Eldredges. 
(B) THERE \YAS NO CONSIDERATIOX 
FOR THE PROMISE TO RELEASE 
FUTURE LIENS 
\Y e do not contend that the third party beneficiary 
must furnish consideration for the promise as a condition 
to enforcing it. What we do maintain is that the promise 
must be supported by a consideration furnished either 
hy the prmnisee or the third party beneficiary. In the 
present case, neither Prudential nor Brimwood furnished 
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an~· considPration for the promise of the defendant to 
release the future liens. If the release had been given in 
compromise of a disputed clai1n, there might be a basis 
for finding a consideration for the promise. But no such 
dispute existed and the undisputed testimony is that 
Prudential intended the release as a discharge of the 
lien onl~~ to the extent of the amount paid to defendant 
(R. 146-151). Furthermore, Prudential did not treat the 
execution of the initial receipt release by the defendant 
on each lot as sufficient to rele.ase the lot from any claim 
of lien b~· defendant for material which was not paid for. 
Instead, it required the defendant to execute a release 
affecting the smne lot every time Prudential made a dis-
bursen1ent pursuant to the authorization for payment. In 
this posture of the case, the promise to release liens 
that may or may not arise cannot be enforced, bec.ause it 
is without consideration from any source. Neither the 
plaintiff nor Prudential give up anything for such a 
promise and will suffer no detriment by reason of it. 
This point arose in the c.ase of Ha.ines v. Pacific 
Bancorporation, 30 P.2d 763. The plaintiff Haines owned 
200 shares of stock in the Portland National Bank. In 
order to obtain control of the bank, the defendant en-
tered into an .agreement with the remaining stockholders, 
to purchase their stock for $150 per share. In the same 
contract, the defendant agreed to purchase the plaintiff's 
:-;tock for $300 per share. The plaintiff brought suit on 
this contract to recover $60,000 for his 200 shares of 
stock. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that the plain-
tiff was an incidental beneficiary of the contract, and 
could not maintain any action upon it. It also pointed 
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out that plaintiff could not enforce the promise, bec.ause 
there was no consideration for it. We quote from the 
opinion at page 764: 
"It is clear from these allegations of thP 
cornplaint that the consideration for the promise 
relied upon by the plaintiff was the transfer to 
the defendant of stock by persons other than 
plaintiff for which the stipulated price has been 
paid. The contract, therefore, was not made for 
the sole benefit of the plaintiff, nor was the pri-
mary purpose of the contract to benefit the plain-
tiff. He w.as not a. party to the contract. He 
furnished no part of the consideration, and what-
ever benefit he was to receive was merely inci-
dental to the terms of a sale of property in which 
he had no interest .... " 
(C) EQUITY FORBIDS THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE RECEIPT RELEASE 
ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFF. 
To allow the plaintiff to use the receipt release to 
deprive the defendant of .a valid and subsisting lien upon 
the property would amount to the condonation of a fraud 
upon the defendant even though the language of the in-
strument Inay be sufficient to accomplish that effect. In 
Esser v. Community, etc. School District No. 62, 81 N.E. 
2d 270, 335 Ill. App. 199, the plaintiff had agreed to 
construct .a school building for the defendant. In the 
course of construction of the building, the bank in which 
the school district's funds were deposited failed and de-
fendant was unable to pay the plaintiff for the labor and 
material furnished. The district applied to a federal 
agency for funds to complete the building. The agency 
required that the plaintiff release its claim against the 
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district in order to give priority to the government loan. 
The plaintiff released his claim and the government con-
summated the loan. The district then refused to pay the 
plaintiff asserting that he had released his claim. The 
court held otherwise. The following quotation is par-
ticularly applicable to the present case. 
''. . . There is also another rule of construc-
tion which applies in the present case. If A re-
ceives a contract or other instrument from B, 
knowing that it w.as designed by B to bear a 
particular interpretation and to be used only for 
a specific purpose, then A has no right to give it 
a different interpretation, or to use it for a dif-
ferent purpose, though such new purpose may be 
consistent with the language of the instrument. 
To permit A to pervert the instrwment from the 
purpose for which he knew it was intended by B, 
wou-ld be to permit him to commit a fraud. This 
rule is founded upon the plmiJnest dictates of 
natural justice. (Italics ours.) The above rule is 
the established law of this State and has been 
followed in numerous cases. It is particularly 
applicable to the release in the instant case. De-
fendant District is governed by the same standard 
of honesty as a private corporation or a private 
citizen and the law will not countenance any eva-
sion by it of its just debt." 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFF AND THE CROSS-D,EFENDANTS 
CANNOT BE REVIEWED BECAUSE NO 
APPEAL HAS BEEN TAKEN FROM IT. 
On December 6, 1962, the plaintiff and cross-defend-
ants :filed in the district court a pleading designated 
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•• State1nent of Points and Notice of Cross-Appeal" in 
which they give notice that they "hereby cross-appeal to 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah." Then follows 
a "Statement of Point~ on behalf of the plaintiff" assert-
ing that the court erred in finding a total debt due of 
$3,911.64 plus interest on the ground that: 1. the evidence 
does not support such finding and conclusion; 2. that it 
is not within the pretrial order; 3. that the finding was 
based on an open ''amount" which w:as not pleaded and 
was a surprise and a prejudice to the plaintiff; 4. that 
plaintiff should have been granted relief because of the 
failure of defendant to release its lien, or in the alter-
native that the issue be dismissed without prejudice. The 
document then recites that the cross-defendants join in 
and rely on point 4 of the statement of errors. 
Appellant contends that the foregoing notice and 
statement is a nullity and presents nothing for review. 
The defendant .appealed from specific portions of the 
judgment entered in the lower court. The judgment was 
partly in favor of the defendant and partly in favor of 
the plaintiff. The parts which were in favor of the 
plaintiff \Yere those which adjudged the lien claimed by 
the defendant to be in~alid and unenforceable and 
awarded the plaintiff $1,000 as attorney's fee to be de-
ducted fron1 the amount due to the defendant from the 
plaintiff. No appeal from the portion of the judgment 
di:-;missing the plaintiff's cmnplaint nor that awarding 
the defendant the stun of $3,911.64 plus interest has been 
taken by either the plaintiff, the defendant or any cross-
defendant. The time to appeal from that portion of the 
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judgmPnt <'Xl)ired several d.ays before the plaintiff filed 
the so-called cross-appeal. 
The notice given by the plaintiff and cross-defend-
ants makes no reference to any judgment or portion of 
judgment whatever. It states only that plaintiff and 
eross-defendants cross-.appeal. What they cross-appeal 
from is simply a blind spot. The most that could be 
reaonably read into this notice is that the parties cross-
appeal from the judgment appealed from by the defend-
ant. No other meaning of the words "Cross-Appeal" 
standing alone seems permissable. 
Since the statement of points is directed to a portion 
of the judgment not appealed from, it must under re-
peated decisions of this court be disregarded. Rosen-
tlzyne v. ill athe1rs, 51 Utah 38, 168 Pac. 957; l 7 tah Asso-
ciation of Credit J}[ en v. Board of Education, 54 Uta:h 
135, 179 Pac. 975; Hartford Accident, etc. v. Clegg, 103 
Ftah 414, 135 P.2d 919. 
Rule 7 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides for joint or several appeals and also cross-appeals. 
Paragraph (a) states that parties interested jointly, 
severally, or otherwise in a judgment may join in an 
appeal therefrom, or any one or more may appeal sepa-
ratel:T, or two or more may join in an appeal. When any 
one or nwre parties have filed a notice of .appeal as re-
quired by- Rule 73, other parties may, under Paragraph 
(b) of Rule 7 4, "cross appeal from the order or judgment 
of the lower court without filing a notice of appeal." If 
a cross-appe.al is taken, the party shall within ten (10) 
days file a state1nent of points on which he intends to 
rely on such cross-appeal. 
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Paragraph (b) of Rule 74 is an anomaly. There is 
no cmnparable provision in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure or in any statute previously enacted. Ad-
n1ittedly. it is arnbiguous and confusing. 'Ve submit that 
the cro~~:-;-appeal provided for in paragraph (b) is a 
cross-appe.al from the same judgment that appellant has 
appealed from, and that compliance with it does not 
bring up for review any judgment or part of a judgment 
not identified in the apellant's notice of appeal. The 
purpose of paragraph (b) is to allow the cross-appellant 
to present additional grounds for affirming the judg-
ment appealed from in cases where appellant has made 
a stateu1ent of points relied on and h.as brought to this 
court only parts of the record in the lower court. 
There is no room in the present case for the proce-
dure outlined in paragraph (b) because the appellant has 
brought up the entire record and has not specified other 
than in this brief the points on which it intends to rely. 
?\ o other effect c.an be given to this paragraph without 
nullifying virtually the entire procedure outlined in Rule 
74. 
The respondents may, "rithout resorting at all to 
Rule 7 4 (b), invoke the consideration by this court of any 
ground or reasons that are- open under any part of the 
record. It may do this in its brief. It may not, however, 
make Rule 74(b) perform the functions of Rule 73. 
Regardless of the interpretation that may be placed 
upon paragraph b of Rule 7 4, the points relied upon by 
the cross-appellants are without merit. The contention 
that the evidence does not support a finding that Brim-
wood IIomes, Inc. is indebted to Knudsen Builders Sup-
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ply Company in the sum of $3,911.64 plus interest is 
without any foundation whatever. The finding is not 
only in accordance with the uncontradicted evidence but 
the fact was in effect admitted by the officers of Brim-
wood Homes, Inc. and also by its counsel in open court. 
The further point made that the finding is based on an 
issue not ·within the pretrial order and was a surprise to 
the plaintiff which, if correct, would simply point up the 
fact that there was no genuine dispute between the parties 
as to the amount due to the defendant. The issue is, 
however, presented in paragraph 1 of the pretrial order 
(R. 31). 
Any assertion that the finding is based on an open 
account not pleaded is contrary to the record (see Para-
graph 1 of the Counterclaim and cross-claim (R. 9). 
rrhe claim that plaintiff should have been granted 
relief under its complaint falls by the wayside, if as we 
contend on this appeal, the defendant did not waive or 
release its n1aterialmen's lien. We do not concede that 
the plaintiff would be entitled to any relief under its 
complaint even if the defendant did release its later-
acquired lien but we need not discuss this point since it 
is clear that the receipt release had no such effect. 
SUM~fARY 
Brimwood Homes Inc. was not a party to any of the 
receipt releases, and cannot successfully claim any rights 
or interests thereunder. None of the instruments contain 
any provision or language manifesting any intention of 
the formal parties to confer any direct benefits upon the 
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plaintiff. On the contrary, the release is clear to the 
effect that its provisions were intended to benefit the 
parties to it. The primary purpose of the release was to 
enable the defendant to get its money, and Prudential 
to preserve and maintain the priority of its mortgage 
liens. There is no consideration for any promise to 
release future liens and elementary principles of fair 
dealing prevent the plaintiff from using the receipt re-
lease for that purpose. The conclusion of the trial court 
that the receipt release operated to free the defendant's 
property from all future liens of the defendant is a per-
version of this intent and purpose, and is without any 
support in reason or in law. 
The plaintiff has not appealed from the portions of 
the judgment in favor of the defendant, and this court 
cannot, therefore, review those portions. Respondents' 
cross-appeal and statement of points must be regarded 
as additional grounds relied upon by them for affirming 
the judgment appealed from. They are superfluous since 
such additional points may be presented in the respond-
ent's brief. 
The portions of the judgment appealed from by ap-
pellant should be reversed and the trial court should be 
directed to grant the defendant a decree foreclosing its 
lien and awarding it an attorney's fee in the amount of 
$1000. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
Grant H. Bagley 
H. T. Benson for Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall, & ~fcCarthy 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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